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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, when I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, there were two women in the
United States Senate.' Nationwide, as of 1997, 19% of seated federal judges
were women. 2 Though the laws protecting against sexual harassment had
been in place since the 1970s,3 a woman's chance of winning a sexual har-
assment lawsuit was a longshot. The United States Supreme Court had heard
only one such case.4 In the United States, women earned about seventy cents
for each dollar a man earned.'
On October 15, 1991, Judge Thomas was confirmed as a justice to the
nation's highest court. 6 Momentum from the hearings indicated that the is-
sues I raised during the hearing were only of passing interest. 7 Observers
were equally certain that no woman would come forward with a sexual har-
* Professor of Law, Social Policy, and Women's Studies, Brandeis University, Heller
School of Policy and Management.
1. U.S. Senate, Art & History-Historical Minutes, "Year of the Woman" (Jan. 3, 1993),
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/year-of the woman.htm.
2. ABA, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN AND THE LAW 1 (1998),
http://www.abanet.org/media/factbooks/womenlaw.pdf.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1965).
4. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. Women's Earnings as a Percentage of Men's, 1951-2005, Infoplease.com,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A093820.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
6. Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week of Bitter Battle: 'Time for Healing,'
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al.
7. Julia Lawlor, Thomas Battle Leaves Doubts in Workplace, USA TODAY, Oct. 16,
1991, at B1.
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assment complaint after viewing the Senate's treatment of the issue.8 In
sum, analysts projected that my appearance before the Senate would have a
chilling effect on women's voices. 9 Fortunately, that projection was wrong.
In the weeks following my testimony, open discussions of the hearings and
the topic of sexual harassment began to reshape public opinion on a variety
of gender-related issues.' 0
Since the events of 1991, I've had the opportunity to participate as a
speaker in hundreds of public forums-some about the hearings, some about
sexual harassment, and some about general racial and gender issues. In ven-
ues all over the country, as well as in Asia, Africa, and Europe, the hearings
still resonate. Far from static, they've evolved and taken on significance as
we face new issues of gender equality. The energy the hearings unleashed
pushed the issue of sexual harassment far beyond its predicted limits and
even beyond the numbers of complaints and amounts of monetary awards. "
Today, sexual harassment is correctly viewed as an assault on women's
rights to participate in the economic mainstream as equals to men.
Beyond the harassment issue, Justice Thomas's confirmation hearings
evoked a new consciousness about gender equality in leadership. 12 We be-
gan to reexamine the role that women's rights play in shaping our society. 13
We knew that women should take a more active role in fashioning public
policy and deciding all the issues of the day, not just those that were seen as
typical gender issues.
In 2006, there were seventy-one women in the United States House of
Representatives and fourteen women in the United States Senate.' 4
Women's earnings improved to 80% of men's.' 5 Since the hearings, corpo-
rations have instituted anti-harassment policies and countless women have
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Susan Deller Ross, Sexual Harassment Law in the Aftermath of the Hill-Thomas
Hearings, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER iN AMERICA 237-38 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Cole-
man Jordan eds., 1995).
11. Id.at237.
12. See Guy Gugliotta, Year of the Woman Becomes Reality as Record Number Win
Seats, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A30.
13. See Gwen Ifill, Female Lawmakers Wrestle with New Public Attitude on 'Women s'
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at B7; see also Geraldine A. Ferraro, Women's Issues Are
Now National Issues, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 3, 1992, at 3B.
14. MILDRED L. AMER, Women in the United States Congress: 1917-2006, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS 1 (updated Nov. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30261 .pdf.
15. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Women Narrow Wage Gap as Men's Earnings Shrink,
DENVER POST, Dec. 4, 2006.
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sought relief using these internal procedures. 16 In 2006, 12,025 sexual har-
assment complaints were filed with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).17 Likewise, 15.4% were filed by men.'8
Monetary relief on those resolved by the EEOC without litigation totaled
$48.8 million.'9
In the courts, women and men are filing sexual harassment complaints
and winning unprecedented awards.20 The United States Supreme Court has
ruled in favor of numerous women in harassment suits and recognized that
men who are harassed are equally entitled to sue under federal law. 21 Cur-
rently, women make up over 20% of the federal judiciary figures; however,
the percentage of people of color on the federal bench is less clear. 22 These
are, in fact, better numbers, but they are not good enough.
I argue that a society committed to equal justice under the law must
demand a judiciary that embodies that belief. Professor Judith Resnik states
the issue clearly: "In the contemporary world, where democratic commit-
ments oblige equal access to power by persons of all colors whatever their
identities, the composition of a judiciary-if all-white or all-male or all-
upper class-becomes a problem of equality and legitimacy. 2 3 Equality and
legitimacy require that we increase the inclusiveness of today's judiciary.
For decades, feminist legal scholars have asked how the law fails to
take into account women's experiences.2 4 Critical race theorists have simi-
larly asked how the "received tradition in law adversely affects people of
16. See Sherman M. Fridman, Avoid Sexual Harassment Lawsuits: Sexual Harassment
Lawsuits Can Hurt Any Firm's Bottom Line, http://www.office.com/templates/
page l.asp?docid=33 (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
17. EEOC, Sexual Harassment, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/sexualharassment.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2007).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See John Vering, State Court Juries Continue Employee-Friendly Verdicts, 16 Mo.
EMP. L. LETTER 1 (Apr. 2006) (reporting a $6.8 million award in a sexual harassment com-
plaint); see also EEOC Wins Big in Chicago on Sexual Harassment Claim, 8 EMP. PRAC.
LIABILITY VERDICTS & SETrLEMENT, Jan. 1, 2007 (reporting a $2.355 million award against an
employer on behalf of three former employers).
21. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
22. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, CHARTING OUR PROGRESS: THE
STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 5 (2006); see generally Federal Judicial Center,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2007).
23. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
Tenure, 26 CARDOzO L. REv 579, 597 (2005).
24. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 837
(1990).
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color not as individuals but as a group. 25 Critical race theorists appropri-
ately challenge us to consider "[w]hat would the legal landscape look like
today if people of color were the decision-makers? ' 26 The relevance of the
"woman question" and the "race question" today is clear in light of the recent
appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to the
withdrawal of Harriet Miers' name from consideration. 27 For the first time
since Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg took office in 1993, the United States
Supreme Court had only one female justice. 28 The "race question" is simi-
larly relevant. As we contemplate future judicial appointments, critical con-
sideration must be given to the question of whether, in the twenty-first cen-
tury, the judiciary will be a body that looks more like and reflects the per-
spectives of the population it serves, as well as engages in discussion about
how we can get to a more representative judiciary.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's appointment as the first woman on the
United States Supreme Court was a historical event, 29 as was her resigna-
tion. 30  Her resignation was greeted with widespread public speculation
about the gender of her replacement. 31 Within days of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's resignation, a reporter asked me if her replacement should be a
woman. My response was that the nominee's respect for gender equality was
more important than his or her gender-as though we had to choose between
having a woman and having someone committed to gender equality. My
sincere, but uninspired response barely masked my ambivalence about being
asked whether Justice O'Connor's replacement had to meet a gender litmus
test. My perception was that behind the question was the idea that the
O'Connor seat was the woman's seat-just as many had assumed that the
Thurgood Marshall years on the Court secured a seat for an African Ameri-
can. 32 Few questioned what was behind such a presumption. The idea of
25. Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 85 (1994).
26. Id. at 86.
27. See Anita F. Hill, Why Harriet Miers Mattered, MS. MAG., Winter 2006, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/winter2006/miers.asp.
28. See Bill Mears, Reporter's Notebook: Fun with Dick and Jane-and John, CNN
WASHINGTON BUREAU, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/26/scotus.journal/
index.html.
29. See Nat'l Women's Hall of Fame, Women of the Hall: Sandra Day O'Connor, 1995,
http://www.greatwomen.org/women.php?action=viewone&id=l 15 (last visited Apr. 14,
2007).
30. Adam Liptak, O'Connor Leap Moved Women Up the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2005, at AI.
31. See id; Hill, supra note 27.
32. Talk of a "black seat" on the court began even before Justice Marshall announced his
resignation. See Hal Riedl, Editorial, Should Supreme Court Have a Black Seat? ST. Louis
[Vol. 31
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setting aside a seat for a woman evoked memories of past special protections
for women that often resulted in measures that limited, rather than expanded,
their opportunities. For me, the question hinted that a woman would only be
chosen if she were given special consideration because the vacancy was left
by a woman. Not even the Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee
seemed to challenge the assumption. " None were asking that former Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's replacement be a woman.3 4 Few suggested that
it be a woman of color. It was not hard to conclude that, except when a
woman resigned, the likely nominee would be male, and the outcome sug-
gests that it will likely be a white male.
With a total of nine seats at stake, simply setting aside Justice
O'Connor's seat as a woman's seat seemed more likely to restrict women's
interests than to advance them. Both historical experience and contemporary
theory suggest that the key to women's advancement is not setting aside a
single seat for women, but rejecting the practice of setting aside all the others
for men.
The legal profession has come a long way from the time when the only
choice for including women was to have special protections or set-asides.
We have also moved beyond an era where we believed that we had to ignore
the differences in women's and men's experiences in order to treat them eq-
uitably and offer meaningful inclusion. Despite the fact that in 2004 a ma-
jority (59%) of individuals between the ages of forty and fifty-seven (Baby
Boomers) said that the Civil Rights Movement had a "Major Influence" on
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1990, at 3B. Shortly after he announced his resignation, Justice Mar-
shall advised that President George Bush not use race to justify "picking the wrong Negro and
saying, 'I'm picking him because he's a Negro."' Howard Fineman et al., How Far Right,
NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 19. Although Justice Marshall expressed hope that the nominee
would be "a Negro," according to reported accounts, "he did not think there should be a per-
manent black seat on the high court." Ethan Bronner, Marshall to Retire from High Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1991, at 1. When President George Bush announced Judge Tho-
mas's nomination, he rejected the suggestion that Thomas's race was a factor in his decision.
John Harwood, Bush Selects Black Judge for Supreme Court Seat, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
July 2, 1991, at IA. "I don't think there should be a black seat on the court, or an ethnic seat."
Id. Yet others urged that when President Bush selected Justice Thomas for the Court, he took
race into account and reinforced the idea of a black seat. See Cynthia Tucker, Editorial, Fill-
ing Court Vacancy: Playing Race Politics, ATLANTA CONST., July 6, 1991, at A19.
33. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Democrats Adopt O'Connor as Model for Bush Court
Pick, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at Al; David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Democrats Are Shifting
Focus from Roberts to Other Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A16.
34. See Nagourney, supra note 33; Kirkpatrick, supra note 33.
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their views about governance and politics, 35 the gender and racial make-up of
the courts has changed only incrementally in the past twenty years.3
I argue that for a variety of reasons with regard to substantive changes
in the law as well as perceptions of fairness and the role the judiciary plays in
our society, women judges do make a difference and that race, ethnic, and
gender diversity should be the norm, not the exception. I also assert that
judges, women, and people of color, are making a difference in a variety of
ways, including legal reasoning and public engagement. I offer three exam-
ples: Madam Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court, and Chief Justice
Constance Baker Motley of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. They are
aided in doing so by the legal scholarship of feminist, critical race, and inter-
sectionality legal theorists.
The "woman question" is not a new one, even with regard to judges.37
However, in 1982, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, the first woman to sit on
the Supreme Court of Canada,38 gave that question new prominence. The
title of her widely publicized lecture posed the issue directly: Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?39 According to Madam Justice Wilson's
assessment, the life experiences of women and men cause them to think and
approach the law and legal decision-making differently. 0
Madam Justice Wilson's treatment of the question was presented at Os-
goode Hall Law School and, not surprisingly, she approached the question as
one approaches a legal issue.4 She carefully laid out her arguments for how
the appointment of women to the bench would: 1) help "shatter stereotypes
about the role of women in society that are held by male judges and lawyers,
as well as by litigants, jurors, and witnesses;"42 2) help preserve the public
35. Jeffrey Love, Political Behavior and Values Across the Generations: A Summary of
Selected Findings, STRATEGIC ISSUES RESEARCH (AARP), July 2004, at 11,
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/politics-values.pdf.
36. Rorie Spill Solberg, Court Size and Diversity on the Bench: The Ninth Circuit and
Its Sisters, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 247, 248, 253 (2006).
37. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and
Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2143, 2145-46 (1993).
38. Mimi Liu, A "Prophet With Honour": An Examination of the Gender Equality Ju-
risprudence of Madam Justice Claire L "Heureux-Dubg of the Supreme Court of Canada, 25
QUEEN'S L.J. 417, 423 n.20 (2000); see The Honourable Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, The
Supreme Court of Canada, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/wilson/index-e.asp
(last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
39. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference? 28
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507, 507 (1990).
40. Id. at 519-22.
41. See id. at 507.
42. Id. at 517.
[Vol. 31
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trust by fostering perceptions of diverse representation in the judiciary; 43 3)
reduce problems for women counsel; 44 4) alter "the process of judicial deci-
sion-making; ' 45 and 5) reform legal doctrine, particularly in such areas as
tort, criminal, and family law.46
Madam Justice Wilson's conclusions about women's potential to
change the law fell into two categories.47 She first argued that the appoint-
ment of women judges would alter public perceptions.48 In addition, she
argued that the presence of women on the bench would modify law itself.
49
According to Madam Justice Wilson, the presence of women in the role of
judicial decision-makers and leaders would change the way fellow judges, as
well as lawyers and litigants, saw all women in the judicial process." This,
she concluded, would also change the behavior of women and men. 1 So
too, with more women as judges, the public at large would see the justice
system as more representative of diversity and, presumably, more fair. 52
Madam Justice Wilson's conclusions about women's potential to
change the substance and processes of the law proved to be the most contro-
versial of her claims. She argued that because of their gendered experiences,
women were more willing to contextualize the law and its processes than
were men, who were more formalistic in their approach to decision-
making. 3 These assertions drew fire from critics who challenged many of
Madam Justice Wilson's premises.5 4 Her conclusions were understandably
most offensive to those who view the law as gender, race, and class neutral,
notwithstanding the different life experiences of women and men.55 For
those who believe in law's neutrality, Madam Justice Wilson's arguments
raise the question of whether any effort to appoint more women is misguided
if it is done for the sake of adding the female perspective.56 For those with a
particularly traditional view of the law, the appointment of women who are
43. Id. at518.
44. Wilson, supra note 39, at 518-19.
45. Id. at 519.
46. Id. at 516.
47. See id. at 517-18.
48. Id.
49. Wilson, supra note 39, at 519.
50. Id. at 517.
51. Id. at 521-22.
52. Id. at 518.
53. Id. at 519-20.
54. See Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin, Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson, 41
McGILL L.J. 1, 34 (1995).
55. Id. at 54.
56. See id. at 55.
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perceived as particularly "feminist" in their approach to the law and deci-
sion-making remains very troublesome.57
Canadian law professor Constance Backhouse chronicles the response
to one such judge-Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, the second
woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.58 Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 came under fire for the concurring opinion she wrote in R.
v. Ewanchuk,59 a criminal case involving the question of whether an alleged
sexual assault was actually consensual sex. 60 Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dubd's opinion concurred with the full Court's decision to overturn the dis-
missal of the complaint and to enter a conviction of the defendant. 6' The
opinion also criticized her colleague, Justice John Wesley McClung, who
voted to dismiss the conviction, suggesting that the complainant's repeated
"no"'s during the alleged attack were irrelevant.62 He also implied that a
woman who had had a child out of wedlock, while living with a male part-
ner, was not capable of refusing consent. 63  Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6's opinion advised that judges should avoid the use of "language ...
which not only perpetuates archaic myths and stereotypes about the nature of
sexual assaults but also ignores the law."'  Even further, the opinion noted
that judicial bias, such as that suggested in Justice McClung's opinion, ad-
versely affected a complainant's ability "to rely on a system free from myths
and stereotypes" and on a reasonable expectation of judicial impartiality.65
Although her colleague, Justice Charles Doherty Gonthier, also signed
the opinion, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 received the brunt of the public
criticism. 66 The first came in the form of a letter written by Justice
McClung, which was published in a national newspaper, where he accused
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 of having a "feminist bias" and suggested
that her interjection of "personal invective" into the law could be responsible
"for the disparate (and growing) number of male suicides being reported in
57. See e.g., Lynne Cohen, Gender Irrelevant When Judging a Judge, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
June 2, 1998, at C4.
58. The Honourable Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Supreme Court of
Canada, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/lheureux-dube/index-e.asp (last visited
Apr. 14, 2007); Liu, supra note 38, at 423.
59. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 68 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. Id. at 88.
64. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, 95.
65. Id.
66. Janice Tibbetts & Shawn Ohler, Judges Clash Over Landmark Sex-Assault Ruling:
No Definitely Means No, NAT'L POST, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al.
[Vol. 3 1
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[Quebec Province]. 67 In the public attacks that followed, lawyers and rep-
resentatives from national organizations criticized Madam Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd for feminist judicial activism. 68 Despite the criticism,
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 did not shy away from the feminist label.
Throughout their careers both Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and
Madam Justice Wilson expressed opinions that were characterized as femi-
nist, although Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 came under particular scru-
tiny for challenging what she believed were sexist ideas.69 While Madam
Justice Wilson certainly received public criticism for raising the "woman
question," her willingness to do so may have had a notably positive effect.70
At the time this article was written, of the nine justices on the Supreme Court
of Canada, four were women.71 Three of the appointments came between
2002 and 2004.72 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada is
Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin.7 3 In the context of advising President
Bush on the appointment of women to the United States Supreme Court,
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada
as an example of gender equity.74 As many commentators have noted, the
United States has much to learn about diversity on the bench from Canada's
highest court. 75 By raising the question in a convincing and reasoned man-
ner, Madam Justice Wilson began a dialogue among the bar and the public at
large. She urged change that may not have taken place but for her positions.
II. JUST How WILL WOMEN JUDGES MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Scholars have identified several dominant theories employed by the
United States Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases that are relevant
to judicial appointments.76  One involves difference theory.77  Though
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, Conversations on Equality, 26 MAN. L.J. 273 (1999).
70. See Hawkins & Martin, supra note 54, at 1.
71. Supreme Court of Canada, Current Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/curjudges-e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
72. Supreme Court of Canada, Current and Former Puisne Judges, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformpuisne/index-e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
73. Supreme Court of Canada, Current and Former Chief Justices, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformchief/index e.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
74. Richard Foot, Canadian Top Court Held as Example in U.S., THE GAZETTE, July 13,
2005, at A 13.
75. Clare Dyer, Law: Where Are the Women? Our Judges Are Still Overwhelmingly
Male, White and Public School Educated, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2003, at 16.
76. However, the United States Supreme Court has not incorporated difference theory in
its jurisprudence. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Essay, Gender Law, I DUKE J. GENDER
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Madam Justice Wilson relied on difference theory to support her position
that women judges would change the law, a review of the research reveals no
definitive evidence to confirm that reliance.78 Empirical and anecdotal ac-
counts do not conclusively establish the idea that individual women or
women as a group judge differently than men. However, at least some re-
search finds gender differences.79 For example, political scientists Elaine
Martin and Barry Pyle studied high courts in all fifty states, concluding that,
in divorce decisions, "a judge's gender [tended] to be the primary predictor
of a judge's vote."' In addition, Brenda Kruse's research has concluded that
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg are also in-
fluenced by their gendered experiences in deciding employment cases.8 1
However, empirical research testing the impact of race on judicial decision-
making is inconclusive.82
There is also considerable evidence that some male judges' perspectives
cause them to view women's experiences very differently than women
might.83 Professor Shirley Wiegand has chronicled numerous examples that
demonstrate a judge's apparently limited vision. 4 One of her examples
comes from the case that served as the basis for the 2005 movie North Coun-
try, a grim and painful, if sometimes fictionalized, account of sexual harass-
ment at a mine in Minnesota. 5 The fictionalized version was apparently no
L. & POL'Y 1 (1994) [hereinafter Bartlett, Gender Law]. The primary theories relied on by the
Court are: 1) separate spheres, which allows different treatment based on cultural expecta-
tions and biological differences; 2) formal equality, which requires that women and men be
treated the same; and 3) substantive equality, which calls for rules such as afflrmative action
that can produce equality in results. Id. at 2-6; Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on
Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
501, 519-521 (2004).
77. See MARTHA M1NOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
THE AMERICAN LAW 19, 20 (1990); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (1987).
78. Wilson, supra note 39, at 522.
79. For an overview, see KATHERINE BARTLETr & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND
LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (4th ed., 2006).
80. Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of Judicial
Gender, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 923 (2005).
81. Brenda Kruse, Comment, Women of the Highest Court: Does Gender Bias or Per-
sonal Life Experiences Influence Their Opinions? 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 995, 1021 (2005).
82. Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299,
316 (2004).
83. Kruse, supra note 81, at 996.
84. See generally Shirley A. Wiegand, Deception and Artifice: Thelma, Louise, and the
Legal Hermeneutic, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 25 (1997).
85. NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005).
[Vol. 31
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more grim and painful than the real experience the women faced in the mine
or the hostility they faced because of the suit. 6 According to Wiegand,
Judge Patrick McNulty's opinion:
[R]evealed that he could not understand why one woman
was fearful when a man who she said had exposed himself to
her several years earlier began driving his truck in circles, over
and over, around her work area. "This court has difficulty un-
derstanding why the appearance of a suspected flasher outside
the building in which she was working.., would cause great
fear--of something-in a reasonable woman."
The judge also could not understand why a woman would fear
rape simply because "a man who had repeatedly and crudely
propositioned her suddenly lunged at her one night at work with
his arms spread, only stopping when she began screaming.' 87
Yet such decisions and other evidence of male bias do not establish
sweeping gender differences in judging. And considerable evidence suggests
that other factors, such as ideology, are better predictors than sex in account-
ing for judicial decisions.8 s So, for example, commentators who have looked
specifically at Justice O'Connor's and Justice Ginsburg's voting records
generally find that gender is not a compelling factor in their judging.89
Unlike their Canadian counterpart, Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, both
Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg reject the notion that their gender
guides their judicial decision-making.9 ° In responding to questions of
"whether women judges speak with a different voice," Justice O'Connor
refers to the lack of "empirical evidence that gender differences lead to dis-
cernible differences in rendering judgments." 9' Moreover, she warns that
86. Wiegand, supra note 84, at 46-47.
87. Id. at 47 (quoting Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Judge Put Small Price on Pain; Dam-
age Award Paled by Litigation Norms, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at A13.). It is worth not-
ing that the trial judge who adopted this language was overturned on appeal some eleven
months later. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. Farhang & Wawro, supra note 82, at 302-03.
89. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, O'Connor and Ginsburg: Together and Apart, LEGAL TIMES,
June 9, 2003, at 14. Mauro notes that Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg voted for the
same result approximately 75% of the time. Id. Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Ken-
nedy 83% of the time, while Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Breyer and Justice Souter in
94% of the decisions. Id.
90. Id.
91. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 190-91 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
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such ideas may rely on troubling myths and stereotypes.92 Instead, she sug-
gests that male and female judges alike should seek a collective wisdom
gained through different struggles and different victories.93
Justice Ginsburg draws on her experiences as a judge and as a law
teacher to conclude that there is no discernible difference in the way women
and men reason: "In class or in grading papers.., and now in reading briefs
and listening to [oral] arguments in court . . . , I have detected no reliable
indicator of distinctly male or surely female thinking-or even penman-
ship."94
It is difficult to argue with these two women, in particular, about
whether women judges speak with a different voice, especially given that
there is no clear definition of what a "different voice" means. Moreover,
difference theory is not without its feminist critics. 95 Some feminists advo-
cate for gender equity under the theory of substantive equality. 96 Rather than
look at whether a rule or law treats women and men the same or differently,
substantive equality theory questions whether a law or rule has the effect of
disadvantaging individuals due to their gender.97 Thus, substantive equality
frameworks acknowledge differences, but with the goal of eliminating or
leveling them to encourage more equal outcomes. 98 Affirmative action and
pay equity are the kinds of strategies that advocates of substantive equality
support. 99
Instead of focusing on the question of whether men and women are dif-
ferent, non-subordination theory looks at what meaning society attributes to
those differences. " Assuming that the consequences of male power are
more significant than gender similarities or differences, non-subordination
frameworks concentrate on eliminating power imbalances. 1 ' According to
the theory's major proponent, Catharine A. MacKinnon:
[A] rule or practice is discriminatory . . . if it participates in the
systemic social deprivation of one sex because of sex. The only
question for litigation is whether the policy or practice in question
92. Id. at 192.
93. Id. at 193.
94. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for California Women Lawyers, September
22, 1994, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 5 (1994) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Remarks].
95. See Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 11- 13.
96. Id. at 4-6.
97. Id. at4.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 6.
101. See id.
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integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a de-
prived position because of gender status. '02
For example, under non-subordination theory, sexual harassment vio-
lates principles of equality and should be prohibited because it reinforces
men's power over women." 3 The violation flows from the domination it
supports-not the boorish, bad, or even assaultive behavior itself.' 04
Despite the opportunities that difference and non-subordination theories
offer for positive change, they are not without their feminist critics. Some
commentators, Justice Ginsburg among them, argue that difference theory
risks reinforcing gender-based stereotypes that perpetuate gender-based ine-
quality. 05 By attempting to articulate an all-encompassing meta-narrative,
both theories are criticized for denying class, racial, sexual orientation, and
religious differences among women, making the experiences of white, mid-
dle-class women the model.'0 6 In addition to criticizing MacKinnon's theory
on the grounds that it promotes what amounts to gender "essentialism," some
feminists criticize Catharine MacKinnon for what they call "gender imperial-
ism," namely the assumption that gender is the most important source of
oppression. 107
Critical race theorists have similarly questioned the ways in which the
"received tradition in law adversely affects people of color not as individuals
but as a group."'0 8 Critical race theorists appropriately challenge us to con-
sider: "What would the legal landscape look like today if people of color
were the decision-makers?"' 0 9 Critical race theorists point to similar modes
of racial justice, including one based on ideas of racial pluralism, and another
based on racial diversity."0 Moreover, they have a "'vision of legal knowl-
edge that includes the perspectives and experiences of oppressed people in
the critique and reformulation of legal doctrine"' and eschews the notion that
law is value neutral.l"' But they too are susceptible to criticism by Black
102. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ginsburg, Remarks, supra note 94, at 4-5.
106. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 585, 590 (1990); see also BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 79, at 15.
107. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 106, at 585; Bartlett, Gender Law, supra note 76, at 16.
108. Brooks, supra note 25, at 85.
109. Id. at 86.
110. See id. at 92-93.
111. Id. at 96 (quoting Linda S. Greene, "Breaking Form". 44 STAN. L. REv. 909, 922
(1992)).
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women and Latina scholars for racial essentialism and neglecting the role of
class and gender in their analysis.
However, failure to reach a consensus about whether women and racial
minority jurists reach different conclusions or even reason differently does
not resolve the question of whether there should be more women on the
bench. Whether women judges will make a difference is a larger question
than whether women and men will reach different outcomes in particular
cases. Whether women judges make a difference depends on the role that
judges and judging play in our legal system and must take into account a
variety of professional and community activities in which judges participate.
As the research from various judicial task forces suggests, judging involves
collegiality and a diverse bench enables members to influence each other. 12
In addition, the role of a judge also has significance in terms of percep-
tions about representation. The face of judging, in an emblematic way, mat-
ters as a reflection of access to justice; the diversity of the bench affects pub-
lic perceptions of fairness. Finally, diversity among judges is a reflection of
how power is distributed in the justice system.
Political constituents in the United States rely on several forms of repre-
sentation, including anticipatory representation, introspective representation,
and surrogate representation."' The concept of anticipatory representation is
best explained by the idea that constituents in today's political climate make
selections based on the achievement of specific outcomes rather than "policy
preferences" of representatives. "' In the introspective representation model,
representatives rely on "a set of principles and commitments that derive
partly from their own ideals and partly from their commitment to the collec-
tive decisions of the party" in making decisions. "' Surrogate representation
is a form of non-territorial representation." 6 Thus, an individual without a
certain characteristic or perspective may serve as a representative for "the
interests and perspectives" of others with the same characteristic or perspec-
tive, "even when members of these groups do not constitute a large fraction
of their constituents."'"1 7 Though typically applied to elected political offi-
cials, the ideas behind these forms of representation can be applied to the
judiciary and can serve as a basis for arguing for greater diversity and inclu-
112. See infra notes 130-32.
113. Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 515, 515 (2003).
114. Id. at 517 (citingR. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 17
(1990)).
115. Id. at 521.
116. Id. at 522.
117. Id. at 523.
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sion. 118 As judicial selection becomes more openly ideological and political,
it is time for a more open discussion about what representation can legiti-
mately be sought in the courts. Yet, many of us are uncomfortable with ag-
gressively pursuing diversity in the judiciary given the lack of confidence in,
and outright discomfort with, the idea of different outcomes based on race
and gender.
However, there are other reasons for supporting judicial diversity. I call
the model which I would choose for including women and people of color on
the bench the representative perspective frame. My model borrows ideas
from both difference and non-subordination theories and attempts to address
some of the criticisms of racial and gender essentialism and gender imperial-
ism. As applied to the appointment of judges, my representative perspective
theory rests on three premises: 1) that gender, racial, and ethnic experiences
influence perspectives and worldviews, including one's sense of justice and
how it should be achieved; 2) that the contribution of representative perspec-
tives is substantial and reaffirms the promise of equality under the law by
suggesting that all citizens have the chance to take part in democracy; and 3)
that the failure to have a broad array of perspectives represented undermines
judicial integrity and contributes to false ideas about intellect and compe-
tency.
III. JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE INCLUSIVE COURT
Theories of equality, as well as the law adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in recent years, support greater inclusion in the judiciary.
Despite the fact that Justice O'Connor has been labeled a conservative by
some, and denies that her gender influences her reasoning, she has provided
some important language to support the idea of greater gender inclusion on
the judiciary. 1 9
"A basic tenet of [feminist thinking] is that perspective matters ...
[meaning] understanding women's life experiences requires a different lens"
and a point of view that comes "from living life as a woman and developing
[a gendered] consciousness."' 0 Critical race theorists argue that people of
color develop a race consciousness as well. 121
118. See generally Mansbridge, supra note 113, at 521-27.
119. See Kruse, supra note 81, at 996-98
120. Jon D. Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court Makes
Justices More Liberal, BOSTON REV. (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at http://bostonreview.net/
BR3 1. 1/hansonbenforado.html.
121. See id.; see also Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil
Rights in the New Millennium? 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 20 (2002).
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Perspectives and experiences may influence the outcome, but that influ-
ence is not limited to outcome in terms of which party prevails. It can have
other influences on the overall direction the law takes. As Justice O'Connor
stated in her concurring opinion in J E. B v. Alabama ex rel. T B., 122 a case
which challenged the exclusion of women from juries, "one need not be a
sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and result-
ing life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case .... Indi-
viduals are not expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men--or
women."'' 23  The idea that perspective matters is not limited to feminist
scholars or female jurists.' 4 Jon Hanson and Adam Benforado made pre-
cisely that point in their recent Boston Review article, stating that "[m]ost
legal scholars recognize that a judge's antecedent presumptions and perspec-
tives often influence judicial decisions as much or more than her purported
principles and precedents."1 25 As noted earlier, gender is only one of the
antecedents that influence judicial decisions and decision making; race, class,
and sexual orientation, as well as previous areas of practice, are others. 126
Even conservative supporters of Justice Samuel Alito recognized the
importance of a judge's perspective.127  During his confirmation hearing,
they argued that his experience as the son of an Italian immigrant father
would be a positive influence on his ability to relate to the little guy in cases
that might come before him as a United States Supreme Court Justice. 12 8 It
is hard to imagine that the experience of being an immigrant's son could be
any more influential than the experience of being a man is for now eight of
the nine members of the Court.
In addressing whether women judges will make a difference, we also
should not overlook the symbolic and representational role that members of
the judiciary play. Beginning in the 1970s, the federal and state judicial sys-
tems launched initiatives on racial and gender bias. 129 To date, numerous
states and members of the federal circuit courts have taken steps to respond
to bias. 3 ' The need for responses is well documented in task force re-
122. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
123. Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. See Hanson & Benforado, supra note 120.
125. Id.
126. See supra Part II.
127. See Hanson & Benforado, supra note 120.
128. See Patty Reinert, Confirmation Hearings: Alito Vows No "Agenda", HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 10, 2006, at 1.
129. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (2000).
130. See Marcia Coyle, How Deep Is the Poolfor Supreme Court Picks? FULTON COuNTY
DAILY REPORT, Sept. 28, 2005.
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ports."'3 They found bias in a broad range of substantive areas such as fam-
ily law, domestic violence, and criminal law, as well as in administrative
areas such as the appointment and election of judges. 13 2
It is hard to deny, though perhaps impossible to measure, how bias
against women and people of color undermines the integrity of the American
judicial system. However, a measurement of the actual impact is not neces-
sary. Justice O'Connor herself recognized that even the perception of bias
injures the judicial system. As she wrote in the introduction to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals task force: "When people perceive . . . bias in a
legal system, whether they suffer from it or not, they lose respect for that
system, as well as for the law."'3 Virtually all of the task forces concluded
that at least some reforms were necessary to reduce the potential for gender
bias and better serve the ultimate objective of equal justice under the law.'34
In particular, many of the task force reports advocate measures that will in-
crease the number of women on the bench.'35 These reports cite the educa-
tional role women judges play with their male counterparts in addition to the
greater public confidence in the judiciary that come from more diverse repre-
sentation on the bench. 1
36
Given the history of gender and racial bias in our legal system, the over-
representation of white, male perspectives on the United States Supreme
Court undermines the integrity of the American judicial system. Law profes-
sor Lani Guinier has argued that United States Supreme Court appointments
have carried important symbolic messages. 137 In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the
Court affirmed, recognizing that a university had a compelling interest in a
racially diverse student body. 13 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
concluded that for "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
131. See generally John H. Doyle et al., Report of the Working Committees to the Second
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 117 (1997).
132. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM. (1990), reprinted in 22 CONN. L. REv. 733, 733 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM.]; see Doyle et al., supra note 131, at 168-77; Report of Missouri Task
Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REV. 485, 687-704 (1993).
133. JUDGE DOROTHY W. NELSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE
(1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 731, 760 (1994).
134. See id. at 760-61.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardi-
ans at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REv. 113 (2003).
138. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
138. Id. at 333.
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the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and [all] qualified individu-
als of every race and ethnicity."'40 Professor Guinier argues that the same is
said for leadership in the judiciary; and that it too must be open regardless of
race, ethnicity, and gender. 4' Professor Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas argues that
the Grutter decision goes further and demands a critical mass of minority
judges.'42 The Court itself recognized in J. E. B. v. Alabama that exclusion
of women and people of color from juries "causes harm to the litigants, the
community, and the individual jurors" who are excluded.' 43  Similarly, the
failure to include diverse perspectives on the bench has an adverse impact on
litigants, the community, and the underrepresented groups that are excluded.
Throughout this essay, I have been asking the "woman question." How
does the judicial selection process disadvantage women or disregard their
experiences? Perhaps one way to answer that question is to ask the "man
question." How do the judicial selection process and unchallenged selection
standards advantage typically white male experiences and perspectives? In
this context it is important to note that most legal experts believe that there is
an ample number of women and people of color who are qualified to sit on
the Court.'" Of course, that depends on how one determines qualifications.
Much was made of Chief Justice John Roberts' United States Supreme Court
clerkship'45 and Justice Samuel Alito's long experience on the federal
bench,'46 in addition to both men's Ivy League education and law review
experiences. 147 But surely state court experience or other forms of service to
the profession and to the public constitutes equally valuable qualifications.
Had the qualities that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito brought to the
nomination process been the primary criteria in 1983, Justice O'Connor
would not have been nominated to the Court. 148 Her distinguished service
140. Id. at 332.
141. See Guinier, supra note 137, at 175.
142. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclu-
sive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE
&L. 101, 143 (2004).
143. 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
144. See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 935,
955-59 (1998); Coyle, supra note 130.
145. The Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter Supreme Court Biographies].
146. Id.
147. The White House, Judicial Nominations, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocous/judicialnominees/roberts.html, (last visited Mar. 24.
2007); The White House, Judicial Nominations, Justice Samuel A. Alito,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocous/judicialnominees/alito.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
148. Supreme Court Biographies, supra note 145.
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makes clear that other, less traditional backgrounds are equally valuable.
The judicial process, in fact and in appearance, is strengthened by members
with diverse talents, backgrounds, and perspectives. '49
IV. JUDGE CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY: EMBRACING RACE AND GENDER
Will women judges make a difference? In fact, they already have. Ma-
dam Justice Bertha Wilson made a difference by raising the question and by
unapologetically answering it in the affirmative.' 50 An example of true lead-
ership, her answer moved the discussion of women's inclusion in the judici-
ary forward in an unprecedented manner. Also, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's legal opinions and public addresses provide language and ideas
that legal scholars will continue to draw upon to support gender and racial
inclusion in the courts. Other women judges provide similar inspiration.
Judge Constance Baker Motley, the first African American woman selected
for the federal judiciary, is a fitting example on which to close. 5 '
In 1946, just out of Columbia Law School, Judge Motley began her le-
gal career in New York as an attorney with what is now the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and
Education Fund.'52 She was the sole female attorney among those who as-
sisted Justice Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education.'53 She
also argued successfully in several higher education integration cases, in-
cluding the integration of the University of Mississippi and the University of
Alabama. 5 4 When President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed her to the bench
in 1966, she had appeared before the United States Supreme Court ten times
and won nine of those cases. " Her contributions to my appreciation of the
role of judges is numerous, but perhaps her most famous decision came when
she refused to excuse herself from a gender discrimination case involving an
African American woman plaintiff. 15 6 In rejecting the defendants' claim that
her general background and status as an African American female somehow
149. See, e.g., Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day
O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated", 39 AKRON L. REv. 373, 398 (2006).
150. See Wilson, supra note 39, at 517-22.
151. See Columbia University, C250 Celebrates Columbians Ahead of Their Time: Con-
stance Baker Motley, http://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkablecolumbians/
constance motley.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
152. Id.
153. 349 U.S. 294, 296 (1955).
154. Mary L. Clark, One Man 's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The Appoint-
ment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REv. 487, 515 (2004).
155. See id at 515.
156. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 2-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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prejudiced her in the matter, Judge Motley noted that she was not the only
member of the judiciary who possessed both race and gender:
It is beyond dispute that for much of my legal career I worked on
behalf of blacks who suffered race discrimination. I am a woman,
and before being elevated to the bench, was a woman lawyer.
These obvious facts, however, clearly do not, ipso facto, indicate
or even suggest [heightened] personal bias or prejudice .... In-
deed, if background or sex or race of each judge were, by defini-
tion, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could
hear this case .... 157
To her credit, Judge Motley unapologetically embraced both her race
and her gender as well as the wisdom she had gained through her particular
struggles as a civil rights advocate. 58 In a tribute to Judge Motley before the
American Bar Association, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said of her,
I count it my great good fortune to be among the legions whose
lives Judge Motley touched. She taught me and others of my gen-
eration that law and courts could become positive forces in achiev-
ing our nation's high aspiration-as carved above the entrance to
the U.S. Supreme Court-Equal Justice under Law. 59
Judge Motley embodied our country's high aspirations in her role as lawyer
as well as in her role as a jurist, making her an example for the public at
large, practicing attorneys, and members of the judiciary. In addition to her
personification of the high ideals of the United States Supreme Court, per-
haps no one spoke more persuasively about the need for diversity in the judi-
ciary than Judge Motley:
There is a need for more women and more minorities in the federal
judiciary, but not because I think they bring something totally dif-
ferent to the bench than white men. I don't think women and mi-
norities have a particular view on contract law that's totally differ-
ent from white men. Rather, I believe that having more women
and minorities in the federal judiciary-and the federal courts are a
major part of the national government-builds confidence in the
government. It makes people feel that the government is fair, in
that it includes people from all segments of the population. It says
157. Id. at4.
158. See id.
159. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Constance Baker Motley, 32 HuM. RTs. 26,
26(2005).
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that the courts are fair, in that women, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians,
and other minorities are included among the judges. It says that
the court system is not an all-white male institution as it once
was. 160
V. CONCLUSION
Madam Justice Wilson, and Justice O'Connor, like Judge Motley, are
notable examples of how women judges, in different ways, make a differ-
ence. They give us a greater appreciation for having women as members of
the judiciary and bring us further along the path of achieving a judiciary
which reflects the equality principles we espouse and the legitimacy to which
we aspire. The question of whether we will have the courage to follow their
leadership remains.
160. Clark, supra note 154, at 518-19.
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